Camp David Redux
Category: Dr. Mike Evans, Featured Headlines, Iran, Israel, J.W.N. Exclusives, Middle East News, Religion, The War on Terror
In June 1976, during the only major address on the Middle East of his entire presidential campaign, Jimmy Carter stressed that a pre-condition to peace in the region must be a change in Arab attitude toward Israel. Carter emphasized that such a change must be reflected by tangible and concrete actions, and not just empty words. Among the necessary alterations must be: Recognition of Israel; diplomatic relations with Israel; an end to hostile propaganda against Israel.[i]
Unfortunately nothing has changed since the Carter years. Principals are still demanding that the Arab countries recognize Israel’s right to exist prior to negotiations, and Arab leaders continue to refuse.
In his speech, Carter specifically addressed the Palestinian problem by indicating that “there ought to be territories ceded for the use of the Palestinians. I think they should be part of Jordan and be administered by Jordan. I think that half of the people of Jordan are Palestinians. That would be my preference.”[ii]
Once ensconced in the Oval Office, however, Carter’s Middle East policy contrasted sharply to his pre-election discourse. The president and his counselors predicated talks on the belief that the key to lasting peace in the Middle East was to force Israel to return to the pre-1967 borders. These advisors also cautioned Carter of the necessity for Palestinian self-rule and a pledge of security for the nations of Israel.
Then-Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin considered the American leader to be openly hostile to Israel, and the Israeli leader’s suspicions of Carter only grew stronger after the two men met in Washington in March 1977. The Israeli prime minister, though toughened by years of anti-Israel sentiment, was nevertheless stunned by Carter’s about-face. Rabin’s anger grew exponentially later that month when Carter spoke in Massachusetts. During his speech, the president urged a “homeland for the Palestinians.”[iii]
The Carter contingent demanded Soviet involvement in the process, something that neither Egypt nor its neighbor, Israel, favored. It was diametrically opposite of the Richard Nixon-Henry Kissinger shuttle diplomacy efforts. After a six-hour emergency meeting of Sadat’s cabinet on October 3, 1977, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy personally handed Secretary of State Cyrus Vance a message from Sadat to Jimmy Carter. Although the content of the note was not divulged, the Egyptian media soon left no room for speculation: Sadat objected to what he saw as Carter’s decision to impose a renewed Soviet role in the Middle East peace process.[iv] It was ultimately Egyptian president Anwar Sadat who circumvented Carter and thwarted Soviet participation.
Following the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Sadat determined that the old “business as usual” approach to Israel was simply not working. He began to search for ways in which the two neighboring countries might reach détente. With the backing of Nixon and Kissinger, Sadat signed two separate disengagement agreements with Israel. Sadat sealed the agreements by agreeing to travel to Israel in 1977. The meeting in Jerusalem between the two disparate leaders achieved a second, and perhaps unintended, object; it effectively halted Carter’s ill-advised plan to hold a peace conference in Geneva with full Soviet participation.
After his election in June 1977, Menachem Begin wished to meet with Sadat; he did not want to rely only on Carter’s negotiating skills to make that happen. He sent General Yitzhak Hofi to Morocco to meet with King Hassan. Hofi was surprised to see Sadat’s confidant and senior cabinet minister, Muhammad Hassan el-Tuhamy, in attendance. His presence was sufficient proof that Sadat was at least willing to explore a separate peace agreement with Israel. The meeting set the precedent for further discussions between Egypt and Israel, none of which were arranged by Jimmy Carter.
Sadat’s acquiescence to a meeting with Begin in Israel signaled the first measurable change between the two countries. It was a courageous move by both men. Carter, however, continued to hinder any real progress between the two countries with pronouncements such as “a separate peace agreement between Egypt and Israel is not desirable.” Simply translated, it was not “desirable” if Mr. Carter failed to get the credit.
The president’s own disastrous foreign policy gaffes in Panama, Nicaragua, and Iran, coupled with the abysmal economic situation at home, produced desperation. In 1980, the president determined to push his way into the Middle East peace process by inviting Sadat and Begin to Camp David for a political rendezvous.
Much has been written of the thirteen days of negotiations between the two leaders. But how did Jimmy Carter view his role at Camp David? Was he an interested bystander? Was he a catalyst? Was he an intermediary? Carter perceived his role to be that of an agent of change. Certainly he had a vested interest in the signing of a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. Carter could achieve two major goals at Camp David: the salvation of his presidency and a huge political step toward stability in the Middle East.
Despite the president’s skillful maneuvering of the two protagonists he was forced to avoid one of the major items on his own agenda – a Palestinian state. Once foiled, forever on the offensive; that failure continues to haunt Mr. Carter even today as he unerringly supports the terrorist factions of Hamas and Hezbollah that now inhabit the Palestinian territory.
The real story behind Camp David is not Jimmy Carter’s prowess as a negotiator; it is the determination of two old warhorses to hammer out an agreement that just might have been good for both their homelands. Perhaps the two leaders men knew intrinsically what Carter and his successors have never grasped: The Palestinian issue is the death knell to any possible lasting peace agreement in the Middle East, not the starting point.
[i] Samuel Segev, Jimmy Carter: Foreign Policy and Post-Presidential Years (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), p. 125.
[ii] Ibid, p. 125
[iii] Ibid
[iv] Segev, Sadat – The Road to Peace, p. 45.
